CLASS ARBITRATION: WHO DECIDES?

by

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Notwithstanding the many decisions in which the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified a myriad of issues surrounding class arbitration, one question remains unanswered by the high court: When an arbitration provision is silent as to class arbitration and a party seeks to include a class in the arbitral proceedings, who decides arbitrability, the court or the arbitrator? Put another way, is the question simply a procedural issue to be decided by the arbitrator, or is it a "gateway" issue to be decided by the court?

The federal policy in support of arbitration is well established.[2] So too is the rule that courts must "enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate."[3] When the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")[4] applies, it preempts any contrary state laws.[5] Challenges to the validity of the agreement to arbitrate are to be decided by the court,[6] while challenges to the validity of the contract or instrument containing the arbitration provision are to be decided by the arbitrator.[7] For there to be an enforceable arbitration provision there must be (1) a writing[8] and (2) a

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2 *KPMG LLP v. Cocchi*, 565 U. S. 18, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25, 181 L. Ed. 2d 323(2011) *(per curiam)* (quoting *Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc*., 473 U.S. 614, 631, 105 S. Ct. 3346, 87 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1985).

3 *Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd*, 470 U. S. 213, 217, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 84 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1985).

4 9 U.S.C. § 1, *et seq*.

5 *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 563 U. S. 563, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 179 L. Ed. 2d 742 (2011).

6 There is an exception when the parties' arbitration agreement clearly and unmistakably provides that the arbitrator will determine the question of arbitrability. See *Opalinski v. Robert Half International Inc*., 761 F.3d 326, 329, 335-336 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1530, 191 L. Ed. 2d 558 (2015); *Houston Refining, L.P. v. United Steel Workers Local Union No. 13-227*, 765 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2014).

7 *Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co*., 388 U.S. 395, 87 S. Ct. 1801, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1270 (1967); *Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc*., 537 U.S. 79, 123 S. Ct. 588, 154 L. Ed. 2d 491 (2002); *Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle*, 539 U.S. 444, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 156 L. Ed. 2d 414 (2003).

8 9 U.S.C. § 2; *Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson*, 513 U.S. 265, 115 S. Ct. 834, 836; 130 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1995); *Campbell v. General Dynamics Government Systems Corp*., 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. *2005*).

contractual relationship between the parties.[9] "[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit. . . . An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage."[10] At the same time, arbitration agreements can be declared unenforceable "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."[11] This saving clause permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability," but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.[12]

The long and tortured history of what ultimately spawned the U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis* ("*Epic Systems*")[13] began some 13 years ago. On September 27, 2005, David Ho, an employee of the accounting firm of Ernst & Young ("E&Y"), filed a purported class action in California state court, asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")[14] and the California Labor Code ("CLC") alleging that E&Y failed to compensate them for overtime or required breaks. E&Y removed the case to the Northern District of California, and Ho amended his complaint to add three additional plaintiffs, one of whom was Sarah Fernandez.[15] After the district court granted summary judgment against Ho, and two of the additional plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew, only Fernandez remained to represent the putative class.[16] Two additional cases involving putative classes asserting claims under the CLC[17] were consolidated with the *Ho* action, which was renamed *Fernandez* for class certification purposes. Plaintiffs in the three cases sought to represent two classes of current and former E&Y employees: (1) Staff, consisting of first and second year employees and (2) Seniors, third and fourth year employees, in the auditing and tax groups at E&Y's offices in California.

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9 *Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson*, 561 U.S. 63, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776, 177 L. Ed. 2d 403, 410 (2010); *Interocean Shipping v. National Shipping & Trading Corp*., 462 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1972); *Pollux Marine Agencies, Inc. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp*., 455 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

10 *United Steelworkers v. Gulf Navigation Co*., 363 U.S. 574, 582-583, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1409, 80 S. Ct. 1347 (1960).

11 9 U.S.C. § 2.

12 *Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto*, 517 U.S. 681, 687, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 134 L. Ed. 2d 902 (1996); see also *Perry v. Thomas*, 482 U.S. 483, 492-493, n. 9, 107 S. Ct. 2520, 96 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1987).

13 -- U.S. --, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 200 L. Ed. 2d 889 (2018).

14 29 U.S.C. § 201 *et seq*.

15 *See Ho v. Ernst & Young LLP*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5294 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2009).

16 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5294 at *1-*2.

17 *Landon v. Ernst & Young*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119387 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2009), and *Richards v. Ernst & Young*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16366 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2010).

On September 20, 2011, the court in the Northern District of California District denied certification with respect to the auditing employees but granted the motion with respect to the tax employees.

The denial of certification in *Fernandez* was based on the fact that Fernandez herself was not an adequate class representative.[18] Following denial of class certification, the *Fernandez* plaintiffs moved to add Stephen Morris as a new plaintiff. The court denied Morris's attempt to join the suit, finding that plaintiffs had unduly delayed in attempting to add Morris, but pointed out that Morris could file his own suit. Morris brought suit in the Southern District of New York where another suit by E&Y employees was pending.[19] E&Y moved to transfer the cases to the Northern District of California and the court granted the motion.[20]

When the cases arrived in the Northern District of California, E&Y moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss the cases. The court granted the motion,[21] and the plaintiffs appealed. The Ninth Circuit, in a 2-to-1 decision, reversed the district court and held that an employer violates the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")[22] by requiring employees to sign an arbitration agreement precluding them from bringing a class arbitration regarding wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. The majority relied on a ruling by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") that "an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act when it requires employees covered by the Act, as a condition of their employment, to sign an agreement that precludes them from filing joint, class, or collective claims addressing their wages, hours or other working conditions against the employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial. . . . [W]e find that such an agreement unlawfully restricts employees' Section 7 right to engage in concerted action for mutual aid or protection, notwithstanding the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")."[23]

The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the NLRB's ruling, and held that arbitration agreements precluding employees from bringing a class arbitration are "generally lawful" but that

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18 *See Ho v. Ernst & Young, LLP*, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 106658, at *10-11.

19 *See Sutherland v. Ernst & Young*, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The *Sutherland* plaintiffs asserted a FLSA claim and sought to certify a nationwide FLSA class. Unlike Morris's case, *Sutherland's* putative class involved Staff employees, not Seniors, and asserted state law claims under New York Labor Law, and sought to certify a F.R.Civ.P. Rule 23 class on behalf of only New York-based employees.

20 *Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129414 (S.D.N.Y., September 11, 2012).

21 *Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP,* 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95714 (N.D. Cal., July 9, 2013).

22 29 U.S.C. § 151 *et. seq*.

23 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012).

agreements which could be reasonably interpreted as prohibiting the filing of an unfair labor practice charge were not.[24]

Although the Fifth Circuit in *D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB* ("*Horton*")[25] held "[t]he use of class action procedures, though, is not a substantive right," it relied on the holdings in *Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor*,[26] and *Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper*,[27] neither of which involved arbitration. The *Horton* court did not discuss the issue arbitrability in class arbitrations or who decides.

A distinction must be made between arbitration clauses which expressly delegate to the arbitrator exclusive authority to determine the arbitrability of any dispute and those which are silent on the determination of arbitrability. In *Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson*,[28] the Supreme Court held "that parties can agree to arbitrate 'gateway' questions of 'arbitrability,' such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy. . . . An agreement to arbitrate a gateway issue is simply an additional, antecedent agreement the party seeking arbitration asks the federal court to enforce, and the FAA operates on this additional arbitration agreement just as it does on any other."[29]

Rule 7 of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") Commercial Arbitration Rules provides, in pertinent part:

> a) The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.
> (b) The arbitrator shall have the power to determine the existence or validity of a contract of which an arbitration clause forms a part. Such an arbitration clause shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitrator that the contract is null and void shall not for that reason alone render invalid the arbitration clause.[30]

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24 *Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB*, 808 F.3d 1013, 1021 (5th Cir. 2015).

25 737 F.3d 344, 357 (5th Cir. 2013). See also *Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB*, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015); *Convergys Corp. v. NLRB*, 866 F.3d 635 (5th Cir. 2017).

26 521 U.S. 591, 612-13, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997).

27 445 U.S. 326, 332, 100 S. Ct. 1166, 63 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1980) ("[T]he right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.").

28 561 U.S. 63, 68-69, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 177 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2010).

29 *Id*., 561 U.S. 68-69.

30 The AAA also has rules for labor and employment matters, consumer claims, and construction disputes.

In *Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.*,[31] the Supreme Court reviewed a petition to vacate an arbitration award that questioned whether a party could be compelled to enter into class arbitration when the agreement is silent on such procedures. The court determined that the plurality opinion in *Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle*[32] was not applicable to that dispute because *Green Tree* only answered the question of who decides whether class arbitration is available, not the standard for determining when it is in fact permissible.[33] As a result, the Supreme Court held that while it is clear "that parties may specify *with whom* they choose to arbitrate their disputes,"[34] . . . "a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party *agreed* to do so."[35]

With most of the major issues surrounding class arbitration having been resolved by the Supreme Court, the nagging question of "gateway" versus "merely procedural" remains unanswered by the high court. The Circuits are divided, so the question may soon make its way to the Supreme Court for resolution.

In *Anderson v. Comcast, Corp.*,[36] Anderson sued Comcast in a purported class action in Massachusetts state court for costs associated with his rental of a cable box. Comcast removed the case to federal court and moved to compel arbitration in accordance with an arbitration provision in Comcast's customer agreement. The provision barred recovery of attorney's fees, precluded arbitration on a class action basis, and prohibited the imposition of punitive damages. The district court ruled that the arbitration agreement's bar on class actions and multiple damages awards were invalid because of a Massachusetts statute.[37]

The First Circuit reversed in part, leaving "determination of the class action question in the first instance to the arbitrator."[38] Nevertheless, the *Anderson* court did not squarely address the issue of class arbitrability beyond a brief, passing reference.

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31 559 U.S. 662, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 176 L. Ed. 2d 605 (2010).

32 539 U.S. 444, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 156 L. Ed. 2d 414 (2003).

33 *Stolt-Nielsen*, at 679.

34 *Id*. at 683. Emphasis original.

35 *Id*. at 684.

36 500 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2007).

37 Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(2), provides: "Any persons entitled to bring such action may . . . bring the action on behalf of himself and such other similarly injured and situated persons."

38 *See also Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp.*, 508 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2007) ("The question of whether plaintiffs otherwise meet the requirements for a class action are for the arbitrator to decide.").

A similar result was reached by the Tenth Circuit in *Dish Network L.L.C. v. Ray*.[39] Ray was a sales associate with Dish. He signed an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")[40] as part of his employment process. When he was terminated, Ray sued Dish in federal court under the FLSA and several Colorado statutes. Dish moved to compel arbitration. Ray dismissed his court case and filed the same claims with the AAA.

Ray then sought to have a class arbitration. The arbitrator determined that he had jurisdiction to decide the issue, reasoning that the determination of whether an arbitration agreement permits classwide arbitration was not a "gateway issue," an issue that is normally decided by courts rather than arbitrators. In addition, the arbitration agreement provided that questions of arbitrability were to be resolved by the arbitrator rather than the courts. The arbitrator decided that classwide arbitration was permissible.

Dish petitioned the court to vacate the arbitrator's ruling regarding class arbitration. The court disagreed with the arbitrator and held that the issue of classwide arbitration was a gateway issue, but agreed that the arbitration agreement in issue required that the arbitrator, not the court, make the arbitrability decision.

Citing the AAA Employment Rules, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the arbitrator had the power to decide the arbitrability and class action issues because the parties "clearly and unmistakably" gave that authority to the arbitrator.

The "arbitrator-v-court" issue was highlighted in *Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. v. Flynn*.[41] Between 2004 and 2013, the Flynns purchased multiple weekly timeshare interests in two Hawaii resorts from Marriott entities (collectively, "Marriott"). In June 2010, Marriott made changes to its timeshare program which allegedly made it more difficult to use the Flynns' interests and diminished the value of their timeshares. The Flynns, individually and on behalf of a potential class, demanded arbitration claiming the changes breached their timeshare agreements and violated state law.

Marriott contended that the Flynns' claims were not subject to mandatory arbitration and brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking a ruling that the dispute was not subject to arbitration and/or an order enjoining the Flynns' demand for arbitration. The Flynns' timeshare agreement contained an arbitration provision which provided:

> Any disagreement or controversy between the Developer and the Association with respect to the question of the fulfillment of the Developer's obligations [(a)]

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39 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 23305 (10th Cir., Aug. 21, 2018).

40 9 U.S.C. § 1, *et seq*.

41 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171722 (D. Haw., December 11, 2014).

> to complete and pay for any Improvement included in the Program,[42] [(b)] to pay for Basic or Special Charges as the Owner of the Developer Ownership Interests in the Program or [(c)] to pay the costs of operating the Program and maintaining it under a Subsidy Agreement shall, at the request of either party, be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the commercial arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association. . . . Issues of arbitrability shall be determined in accordance with the federal substantive and procedural laws relating to arbitration; all other respects of the dispute shall be interpreted in accordance with, and the arbitrator shall apply and be bound to follow, the substantive laws of the State of Hawaii.[43]

The *Marriott* court analyzed the issue of arbitrability when the arbitration provision is silent as to class arbitration, observing that "[m]any courts have since relied on *Bazzle*[44] to conclude that the question is 'procedural,' and should be decided by an arbitrator.[45] At the same time, the Marriott court noted that "[t]wo Circuit courts have held otherwise, determining that whether class arbitration is available is indeed a "question of arbitrability" for a court (absent clear and unmistakable evidence otherwise).[46] These decisions rely primarily on reasoning in *Stolt-Nielsen* and *Concepcion*[47] describing fundamental differences between bilateral arbitration and class arbitration."[48]

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[42] Pursuant to the Timeshare Agreements, Marriott is the "Developer," the "Association" is comprised of all unit owners, and the "Program" is "the common scheme and plan" with regard to timeshare interests and units.

[43] *Marriott* at *13.

[44] *Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle*, 539 U.S. 444, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 156 L. Ed. 2d 414 (2003).

[45] Citing *In re A2P SMS Antitrust Litig*., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74062, at *10 (S.D.N.Y., May 29, 2014); *Harrison v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117154, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 22, 2014); *Kovachev v. Pizza Hut, Inc*., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115284, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013); *Lee v. JP Morgan Chase & Co*., 982 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2013); *Hesse v. Sprint Spectrum L.P*., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20389, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 17, 2012); *cf*. Employers Ins. Co. Of Wausau V. Century Indem. co., 443 F.3d 573, 577 (7th Cir. 2006) ("We find based on *Howsam* that the question of whether an arbitration agreement forbids consolidated arbitration is a procedural one, which the arbitrator should resolve."); *Fantastic Sams Franchise Corp. v. FSRO Ass'n*, 683 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that an arbitrator decides whether an agreement permits "associational arbitration" because the question is not a "question of arbitrability."); *In re A2P SMS Antitrust Litig*., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74062, at *9. ("Associational arbitration" has been defined as "whether an association could represent its members in an arbitration proceeding.").

[46] Citing *Opalinski v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc*., 761 F.3d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 2014); *Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett*, 734 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 3516 (May 19, 2014).

[47] *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 179 L. Ed. 2d 742 (2011).

[48] *See Opalinski,* 761 F.3d at 334 ("[W]e read the Supreme Court [in *Stolt-Nielsen* and *Concepcion*] as characterizing the permissibility of classwide arbitration not solely as a question of procedure or contract interpretation but as a substantive gateway dispute qualitatively separate from deciding an individual

The court continued, pointing out "[h]ere, as discussed above with arbitration in general, the relevant Timeshare Agreements provide that certain disputes 'shall . . . be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the commercial arbitration rules' of the AAA. . . . In turn, Rule 7(a) of the AAA commercial arbitration rules provides that '[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.' . . . And more particularly, an agreement to the AAA's commercial arbitration rules also includes an agreement to the AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration."

The AAA Supplementary Rules provide, in part:

> These Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations ("Supplementary Rules") shall apply to any dispute arising out of an agreement that provides for arbitration pursuant to any of the rules of the [AAA] where a party submits a dispute to arbitration on behalf of or against a class or purported class, and shall supplement any other applicable AAA rules. These Supplementary Rules shall also apply whenever a court refers a matter pleaded as a classaction to the AAA for administration, or when a party to a pending AAA arbitration asserts new claims on behalf of or against a class or purported class.[49]

The AAA Supplementary Rules also provide for "construction of the arbitration clause," as follows:

> Upon appointment, the arbitrator shall determine as a threshold matter, in a reasoned, partial final award on the construction of the arbitration clause, whether the applicable arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a class (the 'Clause Construction Award'). The arbitrator shall stay all proceedings following the issuance of the Clause Construction Award for a period of at least 30 days to permit any party to move a court of competent jurisdiction to confirm or to vacate the Clause Construction Award.[50]

The *Marriott* court also observed that "[m]any courts have held that 'consent to any of the AAA's substantive rules also constitutes consent to the Supplementary Rules and, if a dispute that otherwise would be arbitrated under the AAA rules involves a purported class, then the proceeding is governed by both the AAA rules and the AAA Supplementary Rules for Class

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quarrel. Traditional individual arbitration and classarbitration are so distinct that a choice between the two goes . . . to the very type of controversy to be resolved."); *Reed Elsevier*, 734 F.3d at 598 ("[T]he Court has given every indication, short of an outright holding, that classwide arbitrability is a gateway question rather than a subsidiary one.").

[49] AAA Suppl. Rule 1(a).

[50] AAA Suppl. Rule 3.

Arbitrations.'[51] . . . And it follows that . . . incorporation of the Supplementary Rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of an intent to have an arbitrator address the question of class arbitrability."[52]

But what about an arbitration agreement which makes no mention of AAA rules, state statutes or class arbitration and yet is subject to the FAA? The issue of who decides the class arbitrability question currently depends upon the Circuit. The Third,[53] Fourth,[54] Sixth[55] and Eighth[56] Circuits have held that the decision on class arbitrability is a "gateway" issue which

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[51] Citing *Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Burkett*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148442, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2014) (citing *Bergman v. Spruce Peak Realty, LLC*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131366, at *3 (D. Vt. Nov.14, 2011) (relying upon the Supplementary Rules when referring class arbitration issue to the arbitrator, where parties agreed to "the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA"); *S. Commc'ns Servs., Inc. v. Thomas*, 829 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1336-38 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (holding that AAA Wireless Industry Arbitration Rules "incorporate the AAA Supplementary Rules for ClassArbitrations, which gave the arbitrator the power to decide whether the Arbitration Clause implicitly authorized class proceedings"); and Yahoo! Inc., 836 F. Supp. 2d at 1011-12 (holding that parties' agreement to AAA National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes also constituted agreement to the Supplementary Rules); *Price v. NCR Corp*., 908 F. Supp. 2d 935, 945 (N.D. Ill. 2012) ("[T]he parties' agreement to proceed 'under the AAA's rules' incorporates the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations."); *Reed v. Fla. Metro. Univ., Inc*., 681 F.3d 630, 635 (5th Cir. 2012) ("[C]onsent to any of the AAA's substantive rules also constitutes consent to the Supplementary Rules."), *abrogated in part on other grounds in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter,* 569 U.S. 564, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 186 L. Ed. 2d 113 (2013).

[52] Citing *Yahoo! Inc. v. Iversen*, 836 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1011-1012 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ("[T]he Supreme Court has never held that a class arbitration clause must explicitly mention that the parties agree to class arbitration in order for a decisionmaker to conclude that the parties *consented* to class arbitration."); *Price v. NCR Corp*., 908 F. Supp. 2d 935, 945 (N.D. Ill. 2012) ("[T]he parties' agreement to proceed 'under the AAA's rules' incorporates the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations. By adopting AAA Supplementary Rule 3 in their Agreement, the parties agreed that an arbitrator, and not this Court, would determine whether the Agreement authorizes class arbitration."); *Reed v. Fla. Metro. Univ., Inc*., 681 F.3d 630, 635-636 (5th Cir. 2012) ("The parties' consent to the Supplementary Rules, therefore, constitutes a clear agreement to allow the arbitrator to decide whether the party's agreement provides for class arbitration.").

[53] *Opalinski v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc*., 761 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 2014) (the availability of classwide arbitration is a substantive "question of arbitrability" to be decided by a court absent clear agreement otherwise).

[54] *Del Webb Communities., Inc. v. Carlson*, 817 F.3d 867 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, *Carlson v. Del Webb Communities. Inc*., 137 S. Ct. 567, 196 L. Ed. 2d 444 (2016) (Gateway issue; must be decided by the court).

[55] *Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett*, 734 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 3516 (May 19, 2014).

[56] *Catamaran Corp. v. Towncrest Pharmacy*, 864 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2017).

must be decided by the court. The First,[57] Fifth[58] and Tenth[59] Circuits have held that the issue should be decided by the arbitrator. The arbitration community anxiously awaits the final word from the United States Supreme Court.

[57] *Anderson v. Comcast, Corp.*, 500 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2007).

[58] *Robinson v. J & K Admin. Mgmt. Servs.*, 817 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 6515 (U.S., Oct. 31, 2016) (class arbitrability to be decided by the arbitrator).

[59] *Dish Network L.L.C. v. Ray*, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 23305 (10th Cir., Aug. 21, 2018) (Not a gateway issue; arbitrator can decide class issue).